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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a framework for group membership pro-
tocols preventing the curious but honest server from recon-
structing the enrolled biometric signatures and inferring the
identity of querying clients. This framework learns the em-
bedding parameters, group representations and assignments
simultaneously. Experiments show the trade-off between se-
curity/privacy and verification/identification performances.
Index Terms— Group Representation, Verification, Iden-
tification, Security, Data Privacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Group membership verification is a procedure checking
whether an item or an individual is a member of a group. If
membership is positively established, then an access to some
resources (buildings, wifi, payment, conveyor units, . . . ) is
granted; otherwise the access is refused. Being granted with
this shared privileged access requires that the members of
the group could be distinguished from non-members, but it
does not require to distinguish members from one another.
Indeed, privacy concerns suggest that the verification should
be carried-out anonymously.
This paper studies group verification and also group iden-
tification. In this later setup, there are several groups of
members and one needs to identify in which group the user is
belonging to. This paper focuses on privacy preserving group
identification procedure where group identity of a member is
found without disclosing the identity of that individual.
In computer vision, it is very common to aggregate sig-
nals into one representation [1, 2, 3], but they do not consider
security or privacy. For instance, in [4], Iscen et al. use
the group testing paradigm to pack a random set of image
signatures into a unique high-dimensional vector where the
similarities between the original non-aggregated signatures
and a query signature is preserved through the aggregation.
Recently [5, 6, 7] proposed a framework based on ag-
gregation and embedding of several biometric signatures into
a unique vector representing the members of a group. It has
been demonstrated that this allows a good assessment of the
membership property at test time provided that the groups are
small. It has also been shown that this provides privacy and
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security. Privacy is enforced because it is impossible to infer
from the aggregated feature which original signature matches
the one used to probe the system. Security is preserved since
nothing meaningful leaks from embedded data [8, 9].
This paper revisits the core mechanism proposed by [6].
That work, however, is deterministic in the sense that it learns
group representations based on predefined groups. This pa-
per shows that learning jointly the group representations
and group assignments results in better performance without
damaging the security. This adresses scenarios where the
number of members is too big. Their signatures can not be
packed into one unique group representation with a technique
like [6]. Therefore, members are automatically assigned to
different groups. A light cryptographic protocol is deployed
to secure their privacy during group verification.
2. GROUP MEMBERSHIP
2.1. Notations
The embedding, the assignment, and the group represen-
tations are learned jointly at enrolment, and given to a
server. Biometric signatures are modelled as vectors in Rd.
X ∈ Rd×N is the matrix of the signatures to be enrolled into
M groups. The group representations are stored column wise
in ` × M matrix R. The group representations are quan-
tized and sparse i.e., rg ∈ A` with A = {−1, 0,+1} and
‖rg‖0 ≤ S < `, ∀g ∈ [M ].
At query time, the user computes a sparse representation
of his biometric signature q ∈ Rd. For that purpose, func-
tion e : Rd → A` maps a vector to a sequence of ` dis-
crete symbols. We use the sparsifying transform coding [8, 9]:
p := e(q) = TS(W
>q). After projecting q ∈ Rd on the col-
umn vectors of W ∈ Rd×`, the output alphabetA is imposed
by the ternarization function TS : The `−S components hav-
ing the lowest amplitude are set to 0. The S remaining ones
are quantized to +1 or -1 according to their sign.
2.2. Formulation of the optimization problem
Our group membership protocol aims at jointly learning the
partition, the embedding and the group representations. The
key is to introduce the auxiliary data E = [e1, . . . , eN ] ∈
A`×N the hash codes of enrolled signatures and Y ∈ RM×N
the group indicator matrix (yi,j = 1 if ej is assigned to i-th
group). Then, the optimization problem is composed of a cost
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for embedding CE and a cost for partitioning CA,G:
min
W,R,Y
CE(X,W,E) + CA,G(E,Y,R), (1)
The embedding cost is the loss for quantizing signatures:
CE(X,W,E) :=
N∑
i=1
∥∥ei −W>xi∥∥22 . (2)
The assignment aims at grouping together signatures
sharing similar hash codes: the overall dissimilarity between
members and their group representation is minimized while
the separation between two groups is maximized. Inspired
by Linear Discriminant Analysis, we consider variance to
measure dissimilarity. The within group scatter matrix Sw
and the between group scatter matrix Sb are defined as
Sw =
M∑
g=1
∑
i∈Yg
(ei − rg)(ei − rg)> = (E−RY)(E−RY)>
Sb =
M∑
g=1
rgr
>
g = RY(RY)
>
where Yg = {i ∈ [N ] : yg,i = 1}. The cost for partitioning
is CA,G = λTr(Sw)− γTr(Sb) for some λ, γ in R+.
In the end, the objective function is formulated as:
min
W,R,Y
‖E−W>X‖2F + λTr(Sw)− γTr(Sb)
s.t. WTW = I`
Y ∈ {0, 1}M×N , ‖yi‖1 = 1 ∀i ∈ [N ]
ei ∈ A`, ‖ei‖0 ≤ S
rg ∈ A`, ‖rg‖0 ≤ S
(3)
The constraint on Y ensures that each signature belongs to
exactly one group.
2.3. Suboptimal solution
The solution of (3) is found by iterating the following steps:
W-Step. We fix E, R, Y and update W by solving:
min
W
∥∥E−W>X∥∥2
F
s.t. W>W = I`
(4)
This problem is a least square Procruste problem with orthog-
onality constraint. By setting S := XE>, [10] shows that
W = UV>, where U contains the eigenvectors correspond-
ing to the ` (` < d) largest eigenvalues of SS> and V con-
tains the eigenvectors of S>S.
E-Step. Given W, Y and R, (3) amounts to:
min
E
∥∥E−W>X∥∥2
F
+ λ ‖E−RY‖2F
s.t. ei ∈ A`, ‖ei‖0 ≤ S
(5)
We first find the solution relaxing the constraints and then ap-
ply ternarization function TS to obtain sparse codes:
E = TS(W
>X+ λRY). (6)
(R,Y)-Step. When fixing W and E, the assignment and
group representations are found by minimizing:
min
R,Y
‖E−RY‖2F −
λ
γ
Tr(RYY>R>)
s.t. Y ∈ {0, 1}M×N , ‖yi‖1 = 1 ∀i ∈ [N ]
rg ∈ A`, ‖rg‖0 ≤ S
(7)
As E is fixed, Tr(EE>) is irrelevant to Y, thus minimizing
(7) is equivalent to:
min
R,Y
∥∥∥∥ λλ− γE−RY
∥∥∥∥2
F
. (8)
Relaxing the ternarization constraint, (8) is solved by a k-
means clustering algorithm, i.e.iteratively:
• Update assignments: Each item is assigned to its near-
est group representative.
• Update centroids: g-th centroid is the mean of all e˜i in
group g.
Then the group representation rg is found by applying ternar-
ization function on g-th centroid.
3. EXPERIMENTS
This section presents the datasets used in our experiments and
investigates the performance of the proposed method for two
application scenarios. We compare our scheme with EoA-SP,
AoE-SP [5] and EoA-ML, AoE-ML [6]. For the baselines
N individuals of each dataset are enrolled into M random
groups but for our scheme the algorithm learns how to parti-
tion the enrolled templates.
3.1. Datasets
3.1.1. Face Datasets
Face descriptors are obtained from a pre-trained network
based on VGG-Face architecture [11] followed by PCA and
then L2-normalization with d = 1, 024.
LFW [12]. These are pictures of celebrities in all sort
of viewpoint and under an uncontrolled environment. We
use pre-aligned LFW images. The enrollment set consists of
N = 1680 individuals with at least two images in the LFW
database. One random template of each individual is enrolled
in the system, playing the role of xi. Some other Nq = 263
individuals were randomly picked in the database to play the
role of impostors.
CFP [13]. These are frontal and profile views of celebri-
ties taken in an uncontrolled environnement. We use N =
400 frontal images to be enrolled in the system. The impostor
set is a random selection of Nq = 100 other individuals.
3.1.2. IRIS Datasets
Iris images are prepossessed by the following steps: iris lo-
calization, iris normalization and image enhancement. Then
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Fig. 1: Performances comparison for varying group size m. Pfn at Pfp = 0.05 for group verification.
the feature vectors are extracted by Gabor filters.
CASIA-IrisV1 [14]. The database includes 756 iris im-
ages from 108 eyes of Chinese persons. The images stored in
the database were captured within a highly constrained cap-
turing environment. 3 images were collected in a first session
and 4 images in a second session. The database is created by
randomly sampling N = 80 individuals to be enrolled, and
Nq = 28 impostors.
MMU2 [15]. This dataset contains 995 images corre-
sponding to 100 people with different age and nationality
from Asia, Middle East, Africa and Europe. Each of them
contributes to 5 iris images for each eye. We exclude 5 left
eye iris images due to cataract disease.
3.2. Group Verification
A user claims she/he belongs to group g. This claim is true
under hypothesis H1 and false under hypothesis H0 (i.e. the
user is an impostor). Her/his signature q is embedded into
p = e(q), and (p, g) is sent to the system, which compares p
to the group representation rg . The system accepts (t = 1) or
rejects (t = 0) the claim. This is a two hypothesis test with
two probabilities of errors: Pfp := P(t = 1|H0) is the false
positive rate and Pfn := P(t = 0|H1) is the false negative
rate. The figure of merit is Pfn when Pfp = 0.05.
Fig. 1 compares the performance of our scheme with
baselines for group membership verification. Totally our
scheme gives a better verification performance especially on
CASIA. Since our method tries to simultaneously learn group
representations and assignment, it aggregates similar embed-
ded vectors and this looses less information.
Note that, although LFW and CFP are difficult datasets
due to the ”in the wild” variations, the group membership ver-
ification task is handled well even for large group sizes. This
is not the case for iris datasets. As mentioned before, we make
use of VGG-Face for face datasets while for iris, traditional
feature extraction algorithms are used. So, the big difference
in overall analysis shows how the feature space affect the per-
formance of group membership tasks.
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Fig. 2: Performances comparison for varying group size m
on group identification for CFP(left) and LFW(right). Pfn at
Pfp = 0.05 for the first step of group identification (solid) and
P for the second step of group identification (dashed).
3.3. Group Identification
The scenario is an open set identification where the querying
user is either enrolled or an impostor. The system proceeds in
two steps. First, it decides whether or not this user is enrolled.
This is verification as above, except that the group is unknow:
The system computes δj = ‖p− rj‖, ∀j ∈ [M ], and accepts
(t = 1) if the minimum of theseM distances is below a given
threshold τ . The figure of merit is Pfn when Pfp = 0.05.
When t = 1, the system proceeds to the second step.
The estimated group is given by gˆ = argminj∈[M ] δj . The
figure of merit for this second step is P := P(gˆ 6= g) or the
Detection and Identification Rate DIR := (1−P)(1−Pfn).
Fig. 2 shows that our scheme brings improvement com-
pared to the baselines and the improvement is also better as
the size of groups increases.
The impact of the group size on DIR is illustrated in
Fig. 3. Obviously, packing more signatures into one group
representation is detrimental. It gets worse when the queries
are not well correlated with the enrolled signature.
3.4. Security and Privacy Analysis
A curious server can only reconstruct a single vector rˆg =
rec(rg) from the group representation rg , and this vector
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Fig. 3: The Detection and Identification Rate (DIR) vs. Pfp
for group identification on CASIA-IRISV1.
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Fig. 4: Investigation of trade-off between security and perfor-
mance for varying sparsity level S on CFP (withm = 25) and
CASIA-IrisV1 (with m = 16).
serves as an estimation of any signature in the group. We mea-
sure the security by the mean square error over the dataset:
MSES = (dN)
−1
M∑
g=1
|Yg|∑
i=1
E(‖xi − rˆg‖2). (9)
For the of privacy of query template, a curious server can
reconstruct the query template q from its embedding:
MSEP = d
−1
E(‖Q− rec(e(Q))‖2), (10)
These reconstructions are possible only if matrix W is
known. This is not the case in practice, so we give here an
extra advantage to the curious server. Figure 4 compares
security with AoE-ML [6] where the assignment was im-
posed randomly, i.e. not learned. Different levels of sparsity
are tested. The reconstruction error of queries are close
in either case, yet learning the assignment improves verifi-
cation performance. Reconstructing enrolled signatures is
more difficult due to the aggregation. However, learning the
assignment by similarity correspondence in the embedded
domain decreases the security slightly while improving the
performance a lot.
4. SECURITY PROTOCOLS
This section gives an example of a cryptographic protocol
exploiting the group representations. The experimental sec-
tion showed that grouping secures the enrolled signatures,
but ternarization alone provides less protection to the query.
Therefore, this protocol strengthens the protection of the
querying user. For security reason, the server only manipu-
lates query and the distances in the encrypted domain. For
privacy reason, the server only learns that the query is close
enough to one group representation, but it cannot tell which
group exactly. We assume honest but curious user and server.
This protocol also justifies choices of our scheme: Queries
and group representations are heavily quantized onto a small
alphabet A. They are long vectors but sparse: only S compo-
nents will be processed in the encrypted domain. Moreover,
we have ‖p − r‖2 ∈ [0, 2S]. These facts ease the use of par-
tial homomorphic encryptions with limited module, whence
a low complexity and expansion factor. The group represen-
tations remain in the clear on the server side, and we do not
need fully homomorphic encryption.
The user generates a pair of secret and public keys
(skU , pkU ) for an additive homomorphic cryptosystem e(·)
(say [16]), and sends the query encrypted component-wise.
The server computes its correlation with group representation
rg:
e(p>rg, pkU ) =
∏
i:rg(i)6=0
e(p(i), pkU )
rg(i). (11)
The server also generates a key pair (skS , pkS) for a
multiplicative homomorphic cryptosystem E(·) (say [17]),
and sends the user (E(e(p>rg, pkU ), pkS))g . The user ran-
domly permutes the order of these quantities and masks them
by multiplying them by E(1, pkS). This yields another se-
mantically secure version of the ciphertexts thanks to the
multiplicative homomorphy of E(·). The server decrypts
(e(p>rk, pkU ))k, but the permutation prevents connecting
k back to the group index g. Again thanks to homomorphy,
the server computes (e(ak(2S − 2p>rk − τ) + bk), pkU ))g
where (ak, bk) are random signed integers. The user decrypts
and sends (ak(‖p− rk‖2 − τ) + bk)k to the server. The user
cannot guess the distances ‖p − rk‖2 thanks to the masking
(ak, bk)k, not even the sign of (‖p − rk‖2 − τ). The server
can do this (since it knows (ak, bk)) and thus learns whether
there is one group where (‖p− rk‖2 − τ) is negative.
5. CONCLUSION
We proposed a method for group membership verification and
identification jointly learning group representations and as-
signment. The idea is to minimize the overall distance be-
tween group members while maximizing the separation be-
tween groups in the embedded domain. Yet, the method still
has some rigidness: the prototyping of the embedding (the
sparse ternary quantization), considering mean as group cen-
troids, and assigning a signature to only one group.
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